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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Juan Anthony Jimenez appeals from the judgment entered upon the 
district court's order summarily dismissing his successive petition for post-
conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Underlying Criminal and Initial Post-
Conviction Proceedings 
The facts of the underlying criminal case and initial post-conviction 
proceedings are as set forth in the Respondent's brief filed in Jimenez's prior 
appeal, State v. Jimenez, S.Ct. Docket No. 40109, 1 as follows: 
In the underlying criminal case, the state charged Jimenez 
with aggravated battery in relation to the September 9, 2007 
stabbing of Jay Voshall. ([#40109] R., Vol. 3, pp.424-25.) The 
evidence at trial showed Jimenez and Ruben Nungary got into a 
physical confrontation with Mr. Voshall inside a Maverick 
convenience store. (Trial Tr., 121 p.144, L.7 - p.148, L.22, p.164, 
Ls.10-25, p.178, L.10 - p.180, L.11, p.197, L.20 - p.202, L.17, 
p.269, L.21 - p.270, L.13, p.442, L.18 - p.449, L.3.) Nungary and 
1 The district court took judicial notice of the appellate briefing filed in Jimenez's 
prior appeal, Docket No. 40109, as well as a number of documents contained in 
the clerk's record in that case. (R., pp.165-68.) Contemporaneously with the 
filing of this brief, the state is filing a motion requesting the Idaho Supreme Court 
to also take judicial notice of the clerk's record and appellate briefs in Docket No. 
40109. The appellate proceedings in Docket No. 40109 are presently 
suspended and presumably will remain suspended until this appeal is at issue, at 
which time the Idaho Court of Appeals has indicated Jimenez may move to 
consolidate the two cases for purposes of oral argument. (See #40109 Order, 
dated January 31, 2014.) 
2 The district court in Docket No. 40109 took judicial notice of a number of 
documents from the underlying criminal case, including the transcript of 
Jimenez's criminal trial (Trial Tr.). (See #40109 R., Vol. 3, pp.437-38.) That 
transcript is included in Volume 2 of the Docket No. 40109 clerk's record at 
pp. 116-273. 
1 
Mr. Voshall got into a fistfight. (Trial Tr., p.146, L.23 - p.147, L.9, 
p.199, L.10 - p.201, L.5, p.264, Ls.33-12, p.269, Ls.12-25, p.446l 
L.23 - p.447, L.12.) Then, according to witness accountsP 
Jimenez shoved Mr. Voshall in the stomach area with one hand, 
causing Mr. Voshall to double-over. (Trial Tr., p.147, L.16 - p.148, 
L.6, p.158, Ls.10-17, p.183, L.17- p.184, L.13, p.201, L.8 - p.202, 
L.9, p.470, L.25 - p.471, L.6; see also Trial Tr., p.270, Ls.4-9 
(witness testifying that store surveillance video showed Jimenez 
"lean in towards" Mr. Voshall, "almost with one arm like this towards 
him," "[a]lmost like he was giving him a one-arm hug.").) Jimenez 
and Nungary then exited the store. (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.7-13, 
p.187, L.9-p.189, L.19, p.201, Ls.8-16, p.270, Ls.1-13.) 
As soon as Jimenez and Nungary left the store, Mr. Voshall 
lifted up his shirt and told onlookers he had been "stabbed" or 
"shanked." (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.10-16, p.180, Ls.8-11.) He was 
bleeding from his abdomen, and there was blood on the floor. 
(Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.17-19, p.155, Ls.6-9, p.181, Ls.7-9, p.182, 
Ls.8-11, p.202, Ls.12-21, p.253, L.14 - p.254, L.2.) Paramedics 
responded to the scene and transported Mr. Voshall to the hospital 
for treatment of a one- to one-and-a-half-inch, "straight edged," 
"slightly gaping" epigastric wound. (Trial Tr., p.275, L.13 - p.276, 
L.20, p.281, L.19 - p.282, L.1, p.283, L.17 - p.284, L.2.) 
In the meantime, police located Jimenez and Nungary and 
placed them under arrest. (Trial Tr., p.288, L.1 - p.291, L.23, 
p.294, Ls.2-7, p.302, L.20 - p.304, L.10, p.305, L.14 - p.306, L.7.) 
Jimenez had red stains on the tops of his shoes, which later tested 
positive for human blood. (Trial Tr., p.307, L.22 - p.308, L.17, 
p.343, L.22 - p.344, L.10, p.347, L.1 - p.362, L.13, p.423, L.1 -
p.426, L.7.) Police also canvassed the route Jimenez and Nungary 
took after leaving the convenience store and found along that route 
a knife with red stains on the blade (Trial Tr., p.328, L.3 - p.329, 
L.12, p.362, L.16 - p.367, L.24, p.369, L.15 - p.376, L.22); those 
stains also tested positive for human blood (Trial Tr., p.417, L.15 -
p.419, L.6). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Jimenez guilty of 
aggravated battery. ([#40109] R., Vol. 2, p.291.) The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with nine years fixed. 
([#40109] R., Vol. 3, pp.435-36.) Jimenez's conviction and 
sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Jimenez, Docket No. 
3 Mr. Voshall did not appear as a witness at Jimenez's trial. (See #40109 R., 
Vol. 2, pp.120-21.) 
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35807, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 305 (Idaho App. Jan. 8, 
2010). 
Jimenez filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction 
relief and supporting materials. ([#40109] R., Vol. 1, pp.4-84.) 
With the assistance of appointed counsel, he filed an amended 
petition and a supporting affidavit. ([#40109] R., Vol. 3, pp.360-68.) 
Relevant to this appeal, the amended petition alleged trial counsel 
was ineffective for: (1) "Refus[ing] to consider DNA test on shoes 
when asked by client" (R., Vol. 3, p.362, 11 (9)(b)(viii)); (2) failing to 
"object to, or attempt in any way to exclude, blood test evidence" 
(id., 11 (9)(c)(iii)); (3) failing to "adequately show the DVDNideo 
evidence to client before trial" and otherwise failing to "prepare 
client for cross-examination" (id., 1111 (9)(b)(iii) and (9)(c)(ii)); and (4) 
failing to "request a lesser-included instruction or verdict form for 
Simple Battery" (id., 11 (9)(c)(iv)). Jimenez also filed a motion and 
affidavit seeking DNA testing of the blood on Jimenez's shoes and 
Mr. Voshall's shirt, swabs of which Jimenez alleged were still in the 
state's possession. ([#40109] R., Vol. 3, pp.384-89.) 
The state answered the amended petition and also filed an 
objection to Jimenez's motion for DNA testing. ([#40109] R., Vol. 
3, pp.376-80, 390-91.) Following a hearing, the district court 
denied the motion for DNA testing, concluding the request did not 
meet the specific requirements of I.C. § 19-4902(b), (c). ([#40109] 
R., Vol. 3, pp.392-96; see also 9/19/11 Tr., pp.1-15.) The state 
thereafter moved to dismiss the amended petition in its entirety. 
([#40109] R., Vol. 3, pp.400-36.) Following a hearing, the district 
court granted the state's motion and entered an order of dismissal. 
([#40109] R., Vol. 3, pp.447-86; see also [#40109] 12/9/11 Tr., 
pp.5-25.) Jimenez timely appealed. ([#40109] R., Vol. 3, pp.488-
91.) 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings 
On May 4, 2013, while his appeal from the dismissal of his initial post-
conviction petition was still pending, Jimenez filed a pro se successive petition 
for post-conviction relief and supporting materials. (R., pp.3-64.) The district 
court appointed counsel, who thereafter filed an amended successive petition 
3 
and supporting affidavits. (R., pp.73-75, 94-114.) As he had in his original post-
conviction petition (in Docket No. 40109), Jimenez alleged in his amended 
successive post-conviction petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
request DNA testing of the blood stains on Jimenez's shoes and for failing to 
investigate Xavier Machuca as a witness. (R., pp.95-97.) He also alleged trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of his shoes into 
evidence at trial. (R., pp.97-98.) Jimenez asserted he was entitled to file a 
successive petition because the claims therein were either inadequately raised 
or not raised at all in his first post-conviction petition due to ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel. (R., pp.115-19.) 
The state objected to the amended successive petition and moved to 
dismiss it. (R., pp.120-33, 136-49.) After a hearing, the district court granted the 
state's motion and dismissed the amended successive petition on the alternative 
bases that the claims therein were untimely, that Jimenez had not established a 
sufficient reason for bringing the claims in a successive petition, and that 
Jimenez failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an 
evidentiary hearing on any of his claims. (R., pp.169-85.) Jimenez timely 
appealed from the judgment. (R., pp.186-90, 196-98.) 
4 
ISSUES 
Jimenez states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in concluding that the successive 
petition was not filed within a reasonable time? 
2. Should this case be remanded so that Mr. Jimenez has the 
opportunity to allege that he has sufficient reason to file a 
successive petition in light of Murphy? 
3. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. 
Jimenez's successive petition for post-conviction relief? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Jimenez failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his untimely and 
improper successive post-conviction petition? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
Jimenez Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Untimely 
And Improper Successive Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
The district court dismissed Jimenez's successive post-conviction petition 
on three alternative bases: (1) the petition was untimely; (2) Jimenez did not 
establish a sufficient reason for overcoming the successive petition bar of I.C. § 
19-4908; and (3) Jimenez failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact 
entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on any of his claims. (R., pp.169-85.) 
Contrary to Jimenez's assertions on appeal, a review of the record and the 
applicable law supports the district court's rulings. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). The Court also freely reviews the district court's application of 
the statute of limitation to a post-conviction petition. Schwartz v. State, 145 
Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Freeman v. State, 122 
Idaho 627,628,836 P.2d 1088, 1089 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
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C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Jimenez's Successive Petition As 
Untimely 
A post-conviction proceeding must be commenced by filing a petition "any 
time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the 
determination of an appeal or from the determination of proceedings following an 
appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 19-4902(a). In the case of successive 
petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid application of I.C. § 
19-4902 would preclude courts from considering 'claims which simply are not 
known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise important due process 
issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009) 
(quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)). 
Thus, previously unknown claims are not time-barred if brought within a 
reasonable time of when they were known or should have been known. 
Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 251, 220 P.3d at 1070. 
"In determining what a reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, 
[the appellate court] will simply consider it on a case-by-case basis, as has been 
done in capital cases." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875; see 
also Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 251, 220 P.3d at 1070. Generally, however, 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims "should be reasonably known 
immediately upon the completion of the trial." Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 253, 220 
P.3d at 1072. Moreover, the timeliness of a petition is measured "from the date 
of notice, not from the date a petitioner assembles a complete cache of 
evidence." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. 
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Jimenez filed his successive petition one year after the district court 
dismissed his original petition and more than three years after the final 
determination of his direct appeal in the criminal case. (Compare R., p.3 with 
#40109 R., p.451 and State v. Jimenez, Docket No. 35807, 2010 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 305 (Idaho App. Jan. 8, 2010).) The successive petition alleged trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to request DNA testing of the blood stains on 
Jimenez's shoes, failing to investigate Xavier Machuca as a witness, and failing 
to object on chain of custody grounds to the admission of Jimenez's shoes into 
evidence. (R., pp.3-64, 91-114.) The district court correctly dismissed these 
claims as untimely because, under Idaho law, Jimenez is presumed to have had 
notice of these ineffective assistance of claims "immediately upon completion of 
the trial." Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 253, 220 P .3d at 1072. Even if the 
presumption does not apply, the claims were properly dismissed as untimely 
because the record shows Jimenez had actual notice of the claims no later than 
November 2010, when he filed his initial post-conviction petition. 
As found by the district court, Jimenez raised the first two claims -
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to obtain DNA testing and failing to 
investigate Machuca as a witness - in his original post-conviction petition filed 
November 8, 2010. (R., p.175; see also #40109 R., Vol. 3, pp.362, 366.) 
Although Jimenez did not yet have the DNA test results that excluded the victim 
as the source of blood on his shoes when he filed his original post-conviction 
petition (see R., pp.107-10 (FBI Laboratory DNA report dated February 1, 
2013)), Jimenez clearly did not need those results in order to raise the claim that 
8 
counsel was ineffective for not having the shoes tested before trial. 4 Jimenez 
supported his original post-conviction petition with affidavits in which he averred 
that (1) he told his attorney the blood on his shoes did not belong to the victim 
but instead belonged to Machuca, an individual Jimenez claimed to have been in 
a fight with on the same day the victim was stabbed, (2) despite this information, 
trial counsel never contacted Machuca about the blood evidence, and (3) trial 
counsel "refused [Jimenez's] request to seek DNA tests on the blood evidence." 
(#40109 R., Vol. 1, pp.13-14; #40109 R., Vol. 3, p.366.) The petition was also 
accompanied by Machuca's statement, albeit unsworn, corroborating Jimenez's 
assertions that he and Jimenez fought before the charged stabbing incident, that 
the blood on Jimenez's shoes was his, and that Jimenez's trial counsel never 
contacted him before trial. (#40109 R., Vol. 1, pp.52-53.) These factual claims, 
made in conjunction with Jimenez's original post-conviction petition, clearly 
demonstrate Jimenez had actual notice of his current post-conviction claims at or 
very near the time of trial. Although subsequent DNA testing corroborated 
Jimenez's (and Machuca's) assertions that the blood on Jimenez's shoes did not 
belong to the victim, such was merely additional evidence supporting Jimenez's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; that Jimenez had not yet assembled 
that complete cache of evidence before filing his original post-conviction petition 
did not toll the limitation period for bringing those claims of which he clearly had 
actual notice. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 17 4 P .3d at 875. The district 
4 Nor was the report helpful because, although it excluded the victim as the 
source of blood on Jimenez's shoes, it identified the victim as the source of 
blood on Jimenez's pants and on the knife. (R., pp.107-10.) 
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court thus correctly dismissed Jimenez's first two ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, reasserted in his successive post-conviction petition more than 
three years after the conclusion of the criminal case, as untimely. 
The district court likewise correctly dismissed Jimenez's third ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim on the basis that it was not timely. Jimenez alleged 
in his successive petition that trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a "chain 
of evidence and/or foundation" objection to the admission of his shoes into 
evidence at trial, thereby preventing Jimenez from raising "the issue of chain of 
custody on his appeal." (R., p.97.) Jimenez did not include this claim in his 
original post-conviction petition; however, that petition was accompanied by a 
letter, dated December 15, 2009, in which the Office of the State Appellate 
Public Defender explained to Jimenez that "the chain of custody of the shoes 
could not be raised in direct appeal because it wasn't addressed at the trial 
court." (R., p.176.) Thus, as found by the district court, "this claim was known to 
[Jimenez] on December 15, 2009, well in advance of the time of filing his first 
petition." (R., p.177 (emphasis added).) Jimenez provided no explanation why 
he failed to raise this ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his first petition, 
nor is any explanation apparent from the record. Because Jimenez had actual 
notice of the basis of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim no later than 
December 2009, his failure to bring the claim until May 2013 was simply not 
reasonable. The district court correctly dismissed the claim as untimely. 
In arguing the district court erred in dismissing the claims in his 
successive petition as untimely, Jimenez contends the "reasonable time" to bring 
10 
a successive petition does not begin until the final determination of the original 
post-conviction proceedings. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-8.) This argument is 
frivolous. The Idaho Supreme Court made clear in Charboneau, supra, that, 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902, the time for bringing a post-conviction petition 
commences upon the final determination of the criminal case in which the 
conviction arose. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904, 174 P.3d at 874. The court 
made equally clear that there is no fixed limitation period for bringing a 
successive petition. & at 904-05, 174 P.3d at 874-75. Rather, because I.C. § 
19-4908 contemplates the filing of successive petitions to raise claims that, for 
sufficient reason, were either not asserted or were inadequately asserted in an 
initial application, due process requires that there be a reasonable time within 
which such claims [may be] asserted in a successive post-conviction petition, 
once those claims are known." & at 905, 174 P.3d at 875 (emphasis added). 
Because, as set forth above, Jimenez had actual notice of his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims no later than November 2010, he has failed to 
show error in the district court's determination that those claims, reasserted or 
asserted for the first time in his May 2013 successive post-conviction petition, 
were not filed within a reasonable time. The district court correctly dismissed 
Jimenez's successive petition as untimely. 
D. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Jimenez's Successive Petition 
Because Jimenez Failed To Allege A Sufficient Reason For Overcoming 
The Successive Petition Bar Of I.C. § 19-4908 
Idaho law provides that grounds "finally adjudicated or not ... raised" in an 
initial or amended petition for post-conviction relief generally "may not be the 
11 
basis for a subsequent application." I.C. § 19-4908. Only where the petitioner 
can show "sufficient reason" why claims were "not asserted" or "inadequately 
presented in the original" case may he pursue a successive petition. !st; Griffin 
v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation 
omitted). Ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel does not constitute 
"sufficient reason" for filing a successive petition. Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 
389, 391, 327 P.3d 365, 367 (2014). 
It is undisputed that the current petition is successive. (R., p.171.) It is 
also undisputed that, below, Jimenez relied exclusively upon assertions of 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as his "sufficient reason" for 
filing a successive petition. (R., pp.175-80.) Because ineffective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel is not a basis for avoiding application of the statutory bar 
on successive petitions, the district court properly dismissed the petition as 
successive. 
On appeal, Jimenez acknowledges Murphy but argues that, because the 
proceedings on his successive petition were concluded before Murphy was 
decided, the case should be remanded to allow him the opportunity to show his 
successive petition was justified by a "sufficient reason" other than ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-12.) There are 
at least two reasons why this Court should decline Jimenez's invitation for a 
remand. 
First, granting such a request would be inconsistent with the holding of 
Murphy itself. Relying on established precedent that held ineffective assistance 
12 
of post-conviction counsel may constitute a sufficient reason to overcome the 
successive petition bar of I.C. § 19-4908, Murphy, like Jimenez, alleged 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as the basis for bringing a 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 391-92, 327 
P.3d at 367-68. The district court summarily dismissed the petition, and the 
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, but on grounds never considered or decided by 
the lower court. Specifically, the Court overruled the prior precedent on which 
Murphy had relied and held that, because there is no statutory or constitutional 
right to counsel in a post-conviction proceeding, "ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel is not a sufficient reason under I. C. § 19-4908 for allowing a 
successive petition." Murphy, 156 Idaho at 395, 327 P.3d at 371. Because 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel was the only justification 
Murphy offered for bringing a successive petition, the Idaho Supreme Court held 
the petition was barred by I.C. § 19-4908. 19.:. Notably, although Murphy never 
had notice her successive petition could be dismissed on that ground, the Court 
did not remand the case to allow Murphy to attempt to justify the successive 
petition with some other "sufficient reason." J.9.:.; accord Lopez v. State, 157 
Idaho 795, 339 P.3d 1199 (Ct. App. 2014); Parvin v. State, 157 Idaho 518, 337 
P.3d 677 (Ct. App. 2014). 
The procedural posture of this case is indistinguishable from Murphy. 
Jimenez alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as the sole 
basis for overcoming the successive petition bar of I.C. § 19-4908. Because 
ineffective assistance of counsel is no longer a "sufficient reason" for bringing a 
13 
successive petition, this Court is bound by Murphy to affirm the summary 
dismissal of Jimenez's successive post-conviction petition on this basis. 
In addition to being inconsistent with the holding a Murphy, remanding this 
case to allow Jimenez to attempt to justify his successive petition on some 
ground other than ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel would also be 
inappropriate because doing so would effectively be giving Jimenez a third 
opportunity to avoid the summary dismissal of his petition. After Jimenez filed 
his amended petition and supporting materials, the state moved to dismiss the 
petition on several alternative bases, including that Jimenez's claims of 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel were conclusory and failed to 
demonstrate a sufficient reason for overcoming the successive petition bar of 
I.C. § 19-4908 (R., pp.141-48.) Jimenez responded to the state's motion but 
only cursorily addressed the state's argument regarding the viability of his 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claims to establish a sufficient 
reason for bringing the successive petition, and he never so much as hinted that 
there existed any alternative "sufficient reason" why the successive petition was 
proper. (R., pp.154-58.) Because Jimenez has already been given two 
opportunities - once in his amended petition and once in response to the state's 
motion for summary disposition - to proffer whatever sufficient reason(s) he 
believed existed to justify the filing of his successive petition, his request for a 
third bite at the proverbial apple should be denied. Consistent with Murphy, the 
district court's order summarily dismissing Jimenez's successive petition must be 
affirmed. 
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E. The District Court Correctly Concluded Jimenez Failed To Present A 
Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him To An Evidentiary Hearing 
On Any Of His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
Even assuming Jimenez's petition was not untimely and prohibited by the 
successive petition bar of I.C. § 19-4908, the district court nevertheless correctly 
dismissed the petition on the alternative basis that Jimenez failed to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on any of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
To be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
post-conviction petitioner must satisfy the two prong test set forth by the United 
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The 
petitioner must demonstrate: 1) that counsel's performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have 
been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. A reviewing court evaluates 
counsel's performance at the time of the alleged error, not in hindsight, and 
presumes that "trial counsel was competent and that trial tactics were based on 
sound legal strategy." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127, 
146-47 (1997). Counsel's strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-
guessed on review or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of 
ineffective counsel unless the UPCPA petitioner has shown that the decision 
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 
877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Cunningham v. State, 117 Idaho 428, 430-31, 788 
15 
P .2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. 1990). "The constitutional requirement for effective 
assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a defendant who can 
dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might have been tried 
better." Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). 
In dismissing Jimenez's petition, the district court thoroughly evaluated all 
of Jimenez's claims and supporting evidence and correctly determined, based 
upon the applicable legal standards and underlying criminal and initial post-
conviction records, that Jimenez failed to set forth adequate facts to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on any of his 
ineffective assistance of claims. (See R., pp.172-83.) The state adopts as its 
argument on appeal the reasoning set forth in the district court's order of 
summary dismissal, as well as that articulated by the state in its Respondent's 
brief filed in Jimenez's prior appeal (Docket No. 40109). For this Court's 
convenience, copies of the district court's order and the relevant portions of the 
Respondent's brief filed in Docket No. 40109 are appended to this brief. (See 
Appendices A and B.) 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
summary dismissal of Jimenez's successive post-conviction petition. 
DATED this 1ih day of February 2015. 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
, R BULL, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JUAN ANTHONY JIMENEZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STA TE OF IDAl:iO, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV13-4753 
ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING 
OBJECTION TO SUCCESSIVE 
PETITION AND GRANTING 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL 
Petitioner was convicted of Aggravated Battery for the stabbing of Jay Voshall in 
2008. Petitioner appealed questioning whether the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing a sentence of fifteen years, with nine years fixed. The sentence was affirmed 
by the Court of Appeals in an Unpublished Opinion, 2010 WL 9585462. 
Thereafter, Petitioner filed his first Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in Canyon 
County Case CV-2010-11936 in 2010. An Amended Petition was subsequently filed. In 
the Amended Petition, Petitioner alleged: 
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1. Evidence of material fact existed which were not presented to the jury, 
specifically; 
a. That a witness named Xavier Machuca would testify that the blood found 
on the Petitioner's shoes came from Machuca during a fight that the two 
men had earlier on the same date as the offense; 
b. That the shoes are still available in the custody of law enforcement, Xavier 
Machuca is available, and the DNA test can still be done in connection 
with this Petitioner. 
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the trial court level, specifically: 
a. Inadequate preparation; 
b. Ignorance; 
c. Failure to request a contfnuance to prepare for trial after the court denied 
his motion to withdraw; 
d. Failure to competently represent him at trial. 
Petitioner alleged that trial counsel did not contact or interview any potential 
defense witnesses (including Xavier Machuca), and that trial counsel did not object to 
the admission of the expert testimony on the blood test. In that post-conviction case, 
the district court summarily dismissed the petition on different grounds. The Court 
found that although Machuca provided what purported to be an Affidavit, because the 
affidavit did not contain the necessary elements to make it a legal document, it did not 
contain admissible evidence and therefore, could not be considered. As a result, the 
Court found the Petition failed to adequately support the claim. As to the DNA issue, the 
district court held that even if the DNA testing had been completed and the blood on the 
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shoes did not belong to the victim, it did not establish more probably than not that the 
Petitioner was not the perpetrator pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902(c), and therefore, did not 
allow the testing. 1 The Court summarily dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed the 
dismissal to the Idaho Appellate Courts and Oral Argument is set for February 4, 2014. 
At issue in the appeal are: 1. whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Jimenez's 
motion for DNA testing, and 2. Whether the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
the Petition. As it relates to the DNA testing, the issue is whether the district court 
erroneously required Petitioner to meet the standards of I.C. § 19-4902(b) where the 
test was requested to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to a 
timely-fifed petition under I. C. § 19-4902(a). 
In this action, the Petitioner has filed a successive petition for post-conviction 
relief and claims: 
1. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to request DNA testing of the 
blood stains on Petitioner's shoes at the time of the offense; 
2. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate Xavier Machuca 
as a witness; 
3. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the admission of 
Petitioner's shoes into evidence at the trial; 
The State has filed a motion objecting to the filing of the successive petition on 
the grounds that the claims could have or were raised in the initial petition filed in CV-
1 It should be noted that in a subsequent federal case, Petitioner had tested of several 
DNA samples from the crime scene. The test results indicated the blood on Petitioner's 
shoes did not belong to Mr. Voshall. However, testing did disclose that Mr. Voshall's 
blood was located on two different locations on Petitioner's pants and on the knife found 
near the store where the stabbing occurred. 
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2010-11936 and therefore, have been waived pursuant to !.C. § 19-4908, are barred by 
res judicata and are not timely filed. The state has also filed a Motion for Summary 
Dismissal. 
The standards for post-conviction are clearly established: 
An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction 
Procedure Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 
495, 36 P .3d 1278, 1282 (2001 ). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the 
applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a preponderance of 
evidence the allegations upon which the application for post-conviction 
relief is based. Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 (2000). Unlike 
the complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, an application for post-
conviction relief must contain more than "a short and plain statement of 
the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1}. Rather, 
an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to 
facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. The 
application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting 
its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not 
included. Id. 
Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if 
the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact. I .C. § 
19-4906(b), (c). On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief 
application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine 
whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions 
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally 
construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving 
party. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002), 
citing LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427, 430 
(Ct.App.1997). A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted 
allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. 
Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). When the 
alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial 
court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990), citing 
Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). 
Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of 
relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law. Id. 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). 
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The Charboneau Court also addressed timeliness of successive petitions: 
While I.C. § 19-4908 does not mention whether successive petitions must 
be filed within the one year time limitation, the statute clearly contemplates 
there may be circumstances under which a successive petition may be 
filed if the trial court finds a claim "for sufficient reason was not asserted or 
was inadequately raised" in the original petition. Moreover, as 
acknowledged by the State, there may be claims which simply are not 
known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise important due 
process issues. 
Id. at 904, 174 P.3d at 874. 
Idaho Code § 19-4908 precludes raising any grounds for relief that could have been 
raised in the initial petition if the claims 
were known or should have been known to the petitioner at the time of the 
earlier petition unless the petitioner shows "sufficient reason" why the 
claim was not asserted in the earlier case. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 
933-34, 801 P.2d 1283, 1284-85 (1990); Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 
591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981); Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 945, 947, 908 P.2d 
1252, 1254 (Ct.App.1995). 
Casper v. State, 36042, 2010 WL 9585652 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2010). Notably, 
In Palmer, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that where certain 
allegations were presented in an original petition but then were omitted by 
Palmer's court-appointed attorney without Palmer's knowledge or consent, 
he would not be barred from raising these issues in a successive petition. 
Palmer, 102 Idaho at 595-96, 635 P.2d at 959-60. 
Id. (emphasis in original). Claims not fully litigated in the initial petition are not barred 
based on res judicata unless there was a final adjudication as to the claim. Id., citing 
Palmer, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955. 
While there is no constitutionally protected right to effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel and therefore does not give rise to a valid post-conviction claim, 
"ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel may, however, provide sufficient 
reason for permitting newly-asserted allegations or allegations inadequately raised in 
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the initial petition to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction petition." Ura-Lopez v. 
State, 39967, 2013 WL 6009148 (Idaho Ct. App. July 25, 2013), citing Schwartz v. 
State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct.App.2008), Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 
Idaho 591, 596, 635 P .2d 955, 960 (1981 ); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 
992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct.App.1999). 
In this case, Petitioner conceded that the first two claims - the failure to test the 
DNA and the failure to investigate Xavier Machuca were raised in the 2010 petition for 
post-conviction relief but argues that those issues were inadequately raised in that 
petition. Petitioner asserts that although his third claim was not raised in the initial 
petition, he did not waive the presentation of the issue and the failure to raise the issue 
in the 201 0 petition necessarily demonstrates the issue was not fully and fairly Htigated 
and therefore, can be raised in a successive petition. 
The State argues that all claims are barred by LC. § 19-4908, that the claim 
involving the DNA was fully and fairly litigated in the first petition and is therefore barred 
by res judicata. While the State concedes that the claim involving Xavier Machuca was 
not finally adjudicated and therefore, is not barred by res judicata, it argues the claim is 
not timely filed. As to the third claim, the State asserts that Petitioner has failed to make 
a prima facie showing explaining why the claim was not raised in the first petition 
because the absence of the issue does not necessarily imply ineffective assistance of 
prior post-conviction such that the issue can be raised in the successive petition. 
Instead, the State argues the Petitioner must establish by admissible evidence, that he 
requested the issue be asserted in the first petition but that post-conviction counsel 
declined to pursue the issue. 
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Timeliness 
The first two claims - DNA testing and the Machuca affidavit - were raised in the 
first petition. Thus, Petitioner knew about the claims at the time he filed the first petition 
on November 8, 2010. The Court of Appeals held in Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186 
(Ct. App. 2008), that filing a successive petition 11 months after the denial of a motion 
to extend the filing time for the petition was unreasonable, where Schwartz had 
information that 
included her criminal case number, several facts pertinent to her case, 
and potential claims for post-conviction relief. It is therefore clear that 
Schwartz possessed adequate information to file an application for post-
conviction relief. When Schwartz finally mailed her application, it included 
coherent argument in support of her claim that post-conviction counsel's 
ineffective assistance justified a tolling of the limitation period, as well as 
citation to applicable sections of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure 
Act and case law. Schwartz has thus demonstrated that she had the 
capacity and resources necessary to assert the claim of ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel without the assistance of an 
attorney. 
Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 191, 177 P.3d 400, 405 (Ct. App. 2008). 
In this case, looking both at the initial petition filed in 2010 and at the petition in 
2013, it is clear that Petitioner possessed adequate information to file the successive 
petition sooner than May 14, 2013. Petitioner's 2010 Petition contained: 
1. A four-page petition; 
2. A 42-page affidavit of facts in support of the petition, containing excerpts from 
cases, citation to the triaf transcript and citation to exhibits. The affidavit also 
contaln·s argument, supported by authority, that trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to test the blood on his shoes, failing to argue that the blood came 
from a fight with Xavier Machuca, and failing to contact Machuca; 
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3. The purported affidavit from Mr. Machuca, that contains, substantively, the 
identical information contained in the affidavit filed in the 2013 petition; 
4. An Affidavit of Petitioner; 
5. Photos of the crime scene; 
6. Jury Instructions 1-22. 
His successive petition filed ln 2013 consists of: 
1. A six-page, coherently written petition; 
2. A copy of the Register of Actions from the first post-conviction petition; 
3. A letter Petitioner wrote to the trial court in his criminal case prior to 
sentencing where he outlines the claims regarding the DNA and the claim that 
hi.s attorney did not talk to other witnesses; 
4. A letter dated July 18, 2008, where he again identifies the DNA claim, that he 
told his attorney the evidence and that he didn't get a fair opportunity to cross 
examine the victim; 
5. A letter from the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender dated 
December 15, 2009, specifically explaining that the chain of custody of the 
shoes could not be raised in direct appeal because it wasn't addressed at the 
trial court; 
6. A selection of pages of the trial transcript; 
7. A copy of Jury Instructions 2 and 3; 
8. A copy of the Motion to Withdraw as counsel, filed February 22, 2008; 
9. District Court minutes from hearings held February 22, 2008, March 6, 2008 
and April 10, 2008. 
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Additionally, in 2013, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition, clarifying the issues 
on appeal and attaching: 
1. The affidavit of Xavier Machuca; 
2. The affidavit of J.D. Merris; 
3. The results of the DNA test of blood samples; 
4. The affidavit of the Petitioner. 
The DNA testing was denied on September 19, 2011, which is the time Petitioner 
learned of the claim. Petitioner has provided no explanation as to why it took 20 months 
to renew the claim in the successive petition. 
Similarly, Petitioner was on notice that there were problems with the Machuca 
affidavit no later than May 18, 2012, when the Petition was summarily dismissed. 
Petition has provided no explanation why it took him 11 months and 26 days to file 
essentially, an identical claim regarding the Machuca affidavit. Finally, as to the third 
claim, this claim was known to Petitioner on December 15, 2009, well in advance of the 
time of filing his first petition. Petitioner provides no explanation why he failed to raise 
this in his initial petition, given the detail with which he raised other claims. Given the 
two petitions, Petitioner, like in Schwartz, demonstrated he had the capacity and 
resources necessary to assert the claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel without the assistance of an attorney and therefore, has failed to establish why 
he waited almost three (3) years to raise this claim. Petitioner has failed to argue, and 
support with admissible evidence attached to the petition, why the claims could not be 
raised in a reasonable time following the dismissal of the first petition. As such, . this 
Court finds the successive petition was not timely filed and therefore, grants the State's 
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motion objecting to the successive petition in its entirety. Alternatively, the Court finds 
the Petitioner has not established sufficient reason to justify the filing of the successive 
petition. 
Claim 1: DNA testing 
The Petitioner claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failing to get the DNA tested and that the claim is properly raised in this successive 
petition because it was not fully and fairly litigated in the initial petition. This Court finds 
that the substance of this claim was raised in the initial petition, was adjudicated on the 
merits and is presently before the Idaho Appellate Courts. If the Appellate Courts find 
the post-conviction court erroneously relied on l.C. § 19-4902(b) as opposed to I.C. § 
19-4902(a), the appellate courts will remand that issue to the district court Petitioner 
asserts as justification for renewing the claim that it was post-conviction counsel who 
argued that the testing should be done pursuant to I.C. § 18-4902(b) rather than under 
l.C. 19-4902(a). That claim is not supported by the Record, nor is it supported by the 
arguments made by Petitioner on that issue in the appellate courts.2 Initial post-
conviction counsel did not argue to have the testing completed pursuant to l.C. § 19-
4902(b ), but rather, was "relying on the 'generic section for public defenders and 
funding."' (Tr., Vol 4, p.1, l.15-p.2, L.6). While initial post-conviction counsel conceded 
I.C. § 19-4902 was more specific about DNA testing, counsel clarified that he wanted it 
tested and argued the more general section was a basis to test the DNA material. (Tr., 
Vol. 4, p.12, Ls. 5-15). 
2 This Court takes judicial notice of the briefs filed on appeal in Jimenez v. State, 
Supreme Court Case Number 40109-2012. 
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Appellate counsel argued that the 2010 post-conviction petition was timely filed 
pursuant to I.C. §19-4902(a) and therefore, Petitioner was not required to meet the l.C. 
§ 19-4902(b) standards before getting the testing. Appellate counsel further proffered 
that initial post-conviction counsel "correctly argued that the general right to a public 
defender provided the district court with authority to order the DNA testing" pursuant to 
l.C. §19-4904. (Appellant's Brief, p.4). Thus, Petitioner has failed to show that this claim 
was inadequately raised in his initial petition and therefore, has not provided sufficient 
grounds to include this claim in his successive petition. 
Claim 2 - Machuca Affidavit 
This claim is appropriately raised in a successive petition because post-
conviction counsel did not either include a legally cognizable affidavit or address the 
deficiencies in the affidavit such that the issue could be decided on its merits. However, 
on this issue, the Court grants the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, as there are 
no genuine issues of material fact regarding prejudice, which is discussed below. 
Claim 3 - Failure To Challenge The Chain Of Custody Of The Shoes 
Petitioner argues that the fact that the claim was not addressed in the first 
petition is, in and of itself, grounds to raise the claim in a successive petition. The State 
argues that instead, the standard, as set forth in Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 
P.2d 955 (1981 ), requires Petitioner to demonstrate, by admissible evidence, that the 
claim was raised in the initial petition, and then deleted from any subsequent Amended 
Petitions without Petitioner's knowledge or consent. Otherwise, the State argues, I. C. § 
19-4908 has no real meaning because Petitioners could endlessly proffer new, untimely 
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claims under the guise that because the claim was not raised, it was necessarily omitted 
due to ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel. 
I.C. § 19-4908 requires the petitioner to show "sufficient reason" why the claim 
was not asserted in the earlier petition. This Court need not analyze what constitutes 
sufficient showing because in this case, Petitioner has made no showing at all regarding 
the omission of this claim from the original petition. Instead, he simply points to the 
initial petition and argues because the claim was not in the petition, this Court should 
speculate the omission was the result of post-conviction counsel's deficient 
performance. This Court is unwilling to engage in such speculation. 
Petitioner, like in Schwartz, demonstrated he had the capacity and resources 
necessary to assert various claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 
without the assistance of an attorney. He had detailed affidavits, he had a copy of the 
letter from the SAPD and raised similar issues in the initial petition. Petitioner has not 
offered any reason why he, without the assistance of counsel, was unable to raise this 
claim in his initial petition. The burden is on the Petitioner to show, by admissible 
evidence, sufficient reason why the claim was not asserted in the first petition. Asking 
the Court to speculate about the reason for the omission does not meet that standard. 
Therefore, because Petitioner has not met his burden in justifying the successive 
petition on this ground, the State's Motion Objecting to the Successive Petition as to this 
ground is granted. 
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Motion for Summary Dismissal 
DNA claim and Machuca affidavit 
Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to get the DNA from 
the blood on his shoes tested and for interviewing Machuca. Petitioner sought to admit 
the content of the Machuca affidavit to support one of Petitioner's primary issues in his 
initial post-conviction petition - that the blood on his shoes did not come from Voshall 
Thus, the whole purpose for interviewing Machuca would be either to provide a basis to 
justify the DNA testing or to refute any inferences that the blood on Petitioner's shoes 
came from the Voshall. 
This Court would note the content of the affidavit in this petition is identical to the 
content of the affidavit in the initial petition, with the exception that the affidavit in this 
case is legally cognizable. However, neither of the Affidavits contain sufficient 
foundation for Machuca's conclusion that the blood on Petitioner's shoes belonged to 
Machuca rather than someone else. As such, even if the affidavit in the initial petition 
had been considered by the district court, the essential piece of information - the source 
of the blood - would not have been admissible evidence on which the post-conviction 
district court could rely, thereby defeating Petitioner's purpose for introducing the 
affidavit. 
Petitioner argues that had a legally cognizable affidavit been submitted in his first 
post-conviction petition, the affidavit would have been appropriately indicated who the 
witness was and the substance of that witness' testimony. This, then, would have 
established both the deficient performance by his trial counsel in failing to interview 
Machuca and the prejudice suffered by Petitioner. The Court disagrees. 
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No foundation has been established for Machuca's ability to opine about the 
source of the blood, therefore, he would not have been permitted to testify to that at 
trial. Without the conclusion about the source of the blood, Petitioner cannot establish 
prejudice - that the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
The only admissible portions of the affidavit are: 
1. Machuca got into a fight with Petitioner on September 9, 2007; 
2. He was not contacted by trial counsel; 
3. He agreed to submit to a DNA test regarding the blood samples; and, 
4. Had he been contacted, he would have testified he got in a fight with 
Petitioner on September 9, 2007. 
These statements are insufficient to establish prejudice - i.e., that the outcome of 
the trial would have been different. Even if Machuca had been investigated and even if 
he would have presented the above testimony at the trial, at best, the testimony would 
have allowed defense counsel to argue that perhaps the blood on the shoes came from 
Machuca, an argument not dissimilar from the argument he made. There is no 
admissible evidence indicating that the outcome of the trial would have been different in 
light of the other evidence presented at trial. As such, Petiiioner has not established the 
information in the Affidavit could have been considered by the district court in his first 
petition or that the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
Even if trial counsel had interviewed Machuca, the whole purpose of interviewing 
Machuca was to establish the source of the blood on the shoes. Put another way, 
interviewing Machuca could have provided a basis on which to justify the DNA testing. 
However, the DNA testing has already been done and while the blood on Petitioner's 
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shoes did not come from Voshall, Voshall's blood was found on two different locations 
on Petitioner's pants. Thus, all that has changed is the location of the victim's blood on 
the Petitioner, not the absence of any the victim's blood on the Petitioner. As such, in 
light of the other evidence presented at trial, and given that blood from the victim is 
located on the Petitioner, Petitioner has failed to establish by admissible evidence, a 
genuine issue of material fact that the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
Therefore, the Court grants the State's motion for Summary Judgment on this claims. 
Chain of custody of the shoes 
Similarly, Petitioner has not established by admissible evidence either deficient 
performance for failing to challenge the chain of custody of the shoes nor has he 
established prejudice. Petitioner has not alleged or established that had trial counsel 
filed a motion to suppress the shoes, he would have been successful. In the absence of 
such evidence, Petitioner has failed to sustain his burden of proof and the Court grants 
the State's Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue. 
In sum, the Court dismissed the Successive Petition because the Court finds that 
none of the claims were filed in a reasonable time, that Petitioner has failed to establish 
by admissible evidence that the claims were inartfully or inadequately raised in the first 
petition or were not waived by failing to raise them in the first petitioner and he has 
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact relating to prejudice as to any of his 
claims. 
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Therefore, the Court grants the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal. 
,- 1i< Dated this s0 \ day of December, 2013. 
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Appendix 8 
D. Jimenez Failed To Present A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him 
To An Evidentiary Hearing On Any Of His Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel Claims 
Idaho Code§ 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject 
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence 
raises no genuine issue of material fact" as tq each element of petitioner's 
claims. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing 
I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court 
' 
must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required 
to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by 
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho 
at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 
112 (2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to 
relief, the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to 
dismissing the petition. 1st. (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 
1216, 1220 (1990)). 
As is relevant to this appeal, Jimenez's amended petition alleged that trial 
counsel was ineffective for: (1) "Refus[ing] to consider DNA test on shoes when 
asked by client" (R., Vol. 3, p.362, ,I (9)(b)(viii)); (2) failing to "object to, or 
attempt in any way to exclude, blood test evidence" (id., ,i (9)(c)(iii)); (3) failing to 
"adequately show the DVDNideo evidence to client before trial" and otherwise 
failing to "prepare client for cross-examination" (id., ,i,i (9)(b)(iii) and (9)(c)(ii)); 
and (4) failing to "request a lesser-included instruction or verdict form for Simple 
Battery" (id., ,I (9)(c)(iv)). To overcome summary dismissal of these claims, 
Jimenez was required to demonstrate that "(1) a material issue of fact exist[ed] 
as to whether counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) a material issue of 
fact exist[ed] as to whether the deficiency prejudiced [Jimenez's] case." Baldwin 
v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations 
omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (a 
petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice). 
To establish deficient performance, the burden was on Jimenez "to show 
that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that trial counsel was 
competent and diligent." !Q.. "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-
guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation." k!,_ To establish prejudice, Jimenez was required to show "a 
reasonable probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the 
outcome of the proceeding would have been different." k!,_ 
Application of the foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case 
supports the district court's order of summary dismissal; Jimenez failed to 
demonstrate from his pleadings and evidence that a genuine issue of material 
fact existed as to either the deficient performance or prejudice prongs of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
1. Jimenez Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him 
To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That Trial Counsel Was 
Ineffective For Not Seeking DNA Testing Of The Blood On 
Jimenez's Shoes 
Jimenez alleged trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking DNA testing 
of the blood on Jimenez's shoes, despite Jimenez's requests that he do so. (R., 
Vol. 3, p.362, ,t9(b)(viii).) In support of this claim, Jimenez asserted he told his 
attorney that the blood on his shoes did not belong to the victim, but instead 
belonged to Xavier Machuca, an individual with whom Jimenez claimed to have 
been in a fight on the same day the victim in this case was stabbed. (R., Vol. 1, 
pp.13-14, 53; R., Vol. 3, p.366, ,t9.) According to Jimenez, trial counsel did not 
follow up on this information, either by interviewing Machuca or by seeking DNA 
testing of the blood on Jimenez's shoes. (R., Vol. 3, p.366, ,t,t9, 10.) Jimenez, 
however, did not claim he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged deficiencies. 
(See generally, R, Vol. 3, pp.360-68, 439-44.) 
The district court summarily dismissed Jimenez's claim that trial counsel 
was ineffective for not seeking DNA testing of the blood on Jimenez's shoes, 
concluding Jimenez failed to allege facts that, if true, would establish either the 
deficient performance or prejudice prongs of his claim. (R., Vol. 3, pp.480-81.) 
Specifically, with regard to the alleged deficiency, the court found Jimenez failed 
to allege facts to overcome the presumption that trial counsel's decision not to 
seek DNA testing to discover the source of the blood on Jimenez's shoes was 
anything other than sound trial strategy: 
It has been this Court's experience that competent defense 
counsel does not seek to improve the state's case for the 
prosecutor. Rather, defense counsel commonly spend much time 
cross-examining the state's witnesses about all of the available 
scientific testing and avenues of investigation that the state has not 
done or failed to explore; which is what Mr. Porter did in the instant 
case. DNA testing which could exclude [Jimenez as the 
perpetrator of the crime] would, of course, be a very appropriate 
matter for counsel to explore. That, however, is not the situation in 
this case. 
(R., Vol. 3, p.481 (emphasis original).) Regarding prejudice, the court "discussed 
at length that DNA testing of the blood on the shoes could not exclude [Jimenez] 
as being the perpetrator of the crime" (R., Vol. 3, p.480), explaining: 
DNA testing has proven to be [a] valuable tool in excluding a 
particular person as the perpetrator of an offense in certain 
situations. Such testing is often used in sex offense cases and 
homicide cases where there is bodily fluid or hair on the body of the 
victim or at the scene of the crime. DNA testing can, beyond any 
reasonable doubt, exclude a person as being the source of the 
bodily fluid or hair. In this case, however, [Jimenez's] argument is 
that the blood spots on his shoes belonged to Mr. Machuca with 
whom he had been in a fight earlier in the day, prior to the events 
resulting in the crime charged in the underlying criminal case. DNA 
testing could not exclude [Jimenez] as the perpetrator of the crime 
charged. At best, such DNA testing would exclude the victim as 
being the source of the blood spots on [Jimenez's] shoes .... 
(R., Vol. 3, p.460.) Because the facts alleged by Jimenez, even if true, would not 
have demonstrated Jimenez was not the person who stabbed Mr. Voshall, the 
court found Jimenez "failed to make a prima facie case that there is a reasonable 
probability that the results of DNA testing would have changed the results of the 
trial." (R., Vol. 3, pp.459-60.) 
Jimenez challenges the district court's ruling, arguing trial counsel had a 
duty to investigate the blood evidence relied on by the prosecution and that his 
failure to have DNA testing conducted on the shoes "was objectively 
unreasonable" because "it allowed the State to infer that the blood - which in 
reality was irrelevant - was a key piece of the circumstantial evidence supporting 
Mr. Jimenez's guilt." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) He also contends he "was 
prejudiced by counsel's failure to request the DNA testing," asserting that, but for 
the state's ability in closing argument "to infer Mr. Voshall's blood was on Mr. 
Jimenez's shoes, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different." (Appellant's brief, p.17.) Neither of Jimenez's 
claims have merit. 
While it is well settled that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, it is equally well settled 
that, "[i]n any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must 
be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a 
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments," & (emphasis added). "In 
assessing the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, [the reviewing court] 
consider[s] not only the quantum of evidence known to counsel, but also whether 
the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further." 
Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146, 139 P.3d 741, 748 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; State v. 
Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 307, 986 P.2d 323, 330 (1999)). Unless counsel's 
decision to forego any particular line of investigation is itself based on 
"inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings 
capable of objective evaluation," such decision may not be second-guessed. 
Murphy, 143 Idaho at 145-46, 139 P.3d at 747-48; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 690-91 ("strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts 
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable"). 
Jimenez failed in his post-conviction petition and supporting materials to 
make a prima facie showing that counsel's decision to forego DNA testing of the 
blood on Jimenez's shoes was based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of 
the law, or any other objective shortcoming. Nor does he identify any objective 
shortcoming on appeal. (See Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) Even accepting as 
true Jimenez's assertion that he told trial counsel the blood on his shoes came 
from a fight with Mr. Machuca and not from the victim, Jimenez failed to present 
any evidence to demonstrate that it was unreasonable not to secure DNA 
testing, particularly in light of the other "known evidence" in the case. Murphy, 
143 Idaho at 146, 139 P.3d at 748 (citations omitted). 
The state's evidence showed only that the blood on Jimenez's shoes was 
human blood (Trial Tr., p.423, L.1 - p.426, L.7); the state did not conduct any 
DNA testing on the blood and, therefore, could not identify with any degree of 
certainty the person to whom the blood belonged (Trial Tr., p.432, L.11 - p.434, 
L.15). Although, in hindsight, it appears that DNA testing would have excluded 
Mr. Voshall as the source of the blood on the shoes (see Appellant's brief, p.11 
n.45), it would have at best been a risky proposition for trial counsel to have 
sought DNA testing before trial without knowing for certain what the results of 
that testing would be. Such risk would not necessarily have been worth taking 
because, as explained be the trial court, even if DNA testing could exclude Mr. 
Voshall as the source of the blood on Jimenez's shoes, such would not establish 
that Jimenez was not the person who stabbed Mr. Voshall; it would only 
establish that Mr. Voshall did not bleed on Jimenez's shoes. Given the risks 
associated with the proposed DNA testing, and considering the de minimus 
exculpatory value of even a result excluding Mr. Voshall as the source of the 
blood, it was not unreasonable for trial counsel to forego DNA testing and focus 
instead on exploiting the weaknesses in the state's case (see Trial Tr., p.432, 
L.16 - p.434, L.15 (eliciting from the state's criminalist on cross-examination that 
state's test showed stains on shoes and knife were human blood and that, 
although such tests were available, state did not perform any tests to determine 
whose blood was on shoes and knife); 4/16/08 Tr., p.26, L.1 - p.27, L.1 
(emphasizing in closing argument that state could have done DNA testing but did 
not and, as such, there was no evidence tying the blood on Jimenez's shoes to 
the victim)). See Harrington v. Richter,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 770, 789 (2011) 
5 It is telling that Jimenez has apparently never asked for or secured DNA testing 
of the blood on the knife. (Compare R., Vol. 3, pp.384-89 (motion and affidavit 
requesting DNA testing of shoes and victim's shirt) and Appellant's brief, p.11 n.4 
(indicating Jimenez "was able to secure testing of the shoes and Mr. Voshall's 
shirt" in a separate criminal action) with (Trial Tr., p.417, L.15 - p.419, L.6 (stains 
on knife tested positive for human blood).) Avoiding testing of the knife may also 
have played a role in counsel's tactical choice to not seek testing of the shoes. 
(internal quotes omitted) ("Rare are the situations in which the wide latitude 
counsel must have in making tactical decisions will be limited to any one 
technique or approach."). 
Even assuming some objective deficiency in trial counsel's failure to seek 
DNA testing, Jimenez failed to make a prima facie showing that he was 
prejudiced by that decision. As noted above, the district court found Jimenez 
was not prejudiced because, even assuming DNA testing would have excluded 
the victim as being the source of the blood on Jimenez's shoes, such evidence 
would not have excluded Jimenez as being the perpetrator of the crime. (R., Vol. 
3, pp.459-60, 480-81.) That the prosecutor was able, in the absence of a DNA 
result to the contrary, to rely on the blood stains on Jimenez's shoes as 
circumstantial evidence of his guilt does not, as suggested by Jimenez on appeal 
(Appellant's brief, p.17), alter the correctness of the district court's ruling. 
Jimenez's trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined the state's criminalist 
regarding the failure of the state to have conducted DNA testing on the shoes, 
despite the availability of such test, and elicited from her unequivocal testimony 
that, in the absence of such test, there was no way to tie the blood stains on the 
shoes to the victim. (Trial Tr., p.430, L.11 - p.434, L.15.) Counsel also 
emphasized these facts in closing argument, thereby undercutting the 
significance of the evidence and the state's reliance on it. (4/16/08 Tr., p.26, L.1 
- p.27, L.1.) These details of the trial go unmentioned by Jimenez on appeal, as 
does the fact that the blood on Jimenez's shoes was only one of many pieces of 
evidence the state relied on to prove Jimenez was the person who stabbed Mr. 
Voshall. Other evidence presented and relied on included: (1) the testimony of 
witnesses who saw Jimenez "shove" Mr. Voshall in the abdomen and then, 
almost immediately thereafter, heard Mr. Voshall declare he had been stabbed 
and saw blood coming from his abdomen (see Trial Tr., p.147, L.16 - p.148, 
L.19, p.158, Ls.10-17, p.180, Ls.8-11, p.181, Ls.7-9, p.183, L.17 - p.184, L.13, 
p.201, L.8 - p.202, L.21 ); (2) a surveillance video that showed Jimenez "lean in 
towards" Mr. Voshall, "almost like he was giving him a one-arm hug" and then 
leave the store with one hand in his pocket (see Trial Tr., p.270, Ls.4-9, p.463, 
Ls.1-11 ); (3) the same surveillance video that showed Mr. Vos hall double-over 
after Jimenez came towards him (see Trial Tr., p.470, L.8 - p.471, L.1 O); (4) 
photographs and witness accounts establishing there was blood on the floor very 
near the place Jimenez "shoved" Mr. Voshall (see Trial Tr., p.155, Ls.6-13, 
p.182, Ls.8-14, p.193, L.16 - p.196, L.2); and (5) a bloody knife recovered from 
the route Jimenez and Ruben Nungary took after leaving the store (Trial Tr., 
p.328, L.3 - p.329, L.12, p.362, L.16 - p.367, L.24, p.369, L.15 - p.376, L.22, 
p.417, L.15 - p.419, L.6). Given the strength of this evidence, and considering 
that even a DNA result excluding Mr. Voshall as the source of blood on 
Jimenez's shoes would not have demonstrated Jimenez was not the person who 
stabbed him, there is no reasonable possibility that DNA testing, had it been 
performed, would have changed the result of the trial. Jimenez has failed to 
establish error in the summary dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. 
